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The aim of this paper is to examine the effects of nutritional policies on the behavior of firms, 
particularly in terms of food quality and prices, and to assess the potential impacts of such 
policies from a public health point of view. We determine how new products that are 
nutritionally improved can emerge in a market where incumbent firms offer competing 
unhealthy products. We also highlight a non-intentional effect of such policies: if consumer 
heterogeneity is high, then an information policy may simultaneously provide health benefits 
to the population as a whole but worsen the health of consumers that are less aware of 
nutritional effects. 
For a given level of nutritional tax, we determine the optimal threshold that firms must meet 
to avoid taxation. It appears that this threshold must not be too high if the goal of nutritional 
policies is to increase total health benefits without increasing health disparities between 
consumers. An increase in the tax level has two opposing effects. On one hand, it improves 
health benefits for consumers that are less aware of nutrition issues. On the other hand, 
because it leads to an increase in prices as a result of a reduction in the competition intensity, 





























Many links between chronic diseases and food consumption are now well established. 
Numerous studies have shown that, in combination with sedentary lifestyles, diets 
characterized by excessive salt, sugar or fat intake are associated with high probabilities of 
developing some types of cancer and cardiovascular diseases (WHO, 2003). In order combat 
the development of these food-related diseases, governments enact nutritional policies to 
change consumers’ habits and lead them to healthier food behaviors. 
 
One type of policy is based on education and information campaigns. Generic campaigns like 
the ‘5-a-day’ campaign and targeted interventions addressing groups, such as children at 
school, people suffering from chronic diseases or low-income populations, are implemented 
in many countries to make consumers more aware of the health effects of particular food 
consumption behaviors. A second type of policy aims at raising consumers’ awareness of the 
nutritional value of various foods through the implementation of nutritional labeling. A third 
type of policy relies on changes in food prices by either implementing taxes on unhealthy 
food products or subsidizing healthier foods.  
 
The observed and potential impacts of these policies on consumer behavior have been 
extensively studied. Generally speaking, these policies seem to have some effects on 
consumers’ food consumption behaviors; however, heterogeneity in consumers’ reactions to 
information campaigns and nutritional labeling is often noted. Consumers with higher income 
and/or higher levels of education seem to benefit more from generic campaigns and from the 
inclusion of nutrient information on food packaging (Lusk and Bridgeman, 2009; Baum II and 
Ruhm, 2009; Rashad, 2006; Variyam, 2008; Drichoutis et al., 2008; Ippolito and Mathios, 
1995).  
 
The analysis of the effects of price policies is primarily based on evaluations of direct and 
cross price elasticities that make it possible to determine the substitutions induced by 
modifications in relative food prices. The health impacts of these pricing policies are still 
controversial (Allais et al., 2009; Caraher and Cowburn, 2005; Chouinard et al., 2007; 
Jacobson and Brownell, 2000; Leicester and Windmeijer, 2004; Mytton et al., 2007; 4 
 
Nordström and Thunström, 2009; Schroeter et al., 2008; Smed et al., 2007; Strnad, 2005). 
Some authors suggest that a “fat tax” could induce significant variations in consumers’ 
choices and could contribute to an important reduction in populations’ mean Body Mass 
Index (BMI). However, other authors show that the induced variations are weak or regressive 
and that households with low incomes are more penalized than other segments of the 
population. Moreover, taxation of certain food categories can have ambiguous effects in the 
sense that a positive impact on a specific nutrient can be associated with an unwanted effect 
on other nutrients.  
 
Some have discussed the combined effects of information and price policies (Marette et al., 
2008). It is important to note that the vast majority of research related to nutritional policies 
focuses on the demand side and only deals with consumer behavior; however, firms’ 
strategies and their incentives to improve the nutritional quality of the foods they sell are a 
crucial issue for health policy makers because firms’ reactions in terms of price and product 
quality can amplify or reduce the expected impacts of nutritional policies. For example, 
nutritional education and information campaigns generate opportunities for health-related 
product differentiation that can lead to market segmentation and price modifications. Such 
responses can modify the affordability of healthier products, thus affecting their health 
benefits at the population level. Labeling policies can better inform consumers about the 
nutrient content of foods but may also lead to price changes or product reformulations that can 
have either positive or negative effects. “Fat tax” policies can favor product substitutions, but 
in an imperfect competitive setting such taxes can be partially transmitted to final prices or 
compensated for by a decrease in product quality that can have unexpected consequences. 
 
Apart from some empirical studies investigating the impacts of mandatory nutritional labeling 
(Ippolito and Matthios, 1990; Caswell et al., 2003; Mancino et al., 2008; Moorman, 2005) and 
descriptive studies that assess food supply adaptation (Unnevehr and Jagmanaite, 2008; 
Mojduszka, E.M, 1999; Ricciuto, 2009; L’Abbé et al., 2009), issues related to firms’ 
strategies in reaction to nutritional policies remain relatively unexplored. The objective of this 
article is to contribute to a better understanding of the effects of nutritional policies on firms’ 
behavior, and to assess the potential impacts of such policies on public health. More precisely, 
the goal of this paper is to determine how new products that are nutritionally improved can 
emerge in a market where incumbent firms offer unhealthy products. Indeed, in reaction to 
public policies that penalize unhealthy products (i.e., a “fat tax”), incumbent firms can limit 5 
 
the entry of new healthier products by decreasing the prices of the unhealthy products, thus 
limiting the expected impact of the public policies. Our objective is to specify the conditions 
under which public authorities can avoid these unintentional effects and thus achieve public 
health goals.  
 
Health issues are only one of many criteria that impact consumers’ food choices. Each 
individual food decision depends on both immediate benefits, such as taste or the convenience 
of the product, and long-term consequences on health. To consider the multiple dimensions of 
consumers’ preferences, we propose an analytical approach in a double product differentiation 
framework (Neven and Thisse, 1989). In this framework, the horizontal differentiation axis 
describes the product variety, aggregating all of the product characteristics except nutritional 
quality. The vertical differentiation axis describes nutritional quality. Because consumers’ 
food choices vary according to social groups, we consider two different groups of consumers 
to account for this heterogeneity in terms of nutritional quality preferences. One group is more 
aware of health matters and is willing to pay higher prices for a given nutritional 
characteristic. 
 
On the supply side, we consider a duopoly composed of an incumbent firm that sells an 
outside good whose characteristics are exogenous (Salop, 1979) and a new entrant firm that 
can decide to offer a new product of higher nutritional quality. The incumbent firm cannot 
change its product quality, but its pricing decisions may prevent the other firm from offering a 
healthier product. By offering a healthier product, the second firm expects to capture some of 
the willingness to pay of consumers that are aware of health issues. However, it may also lose 
market share because of the incumbent firm’s reaction. The new entrant must decide whether 
to enter the market or not and determine how to differentiate the new product in terms of 
variety and nutritional quality to achieve maximal profit. This decision relies on expected 
gains from demand, costs associated with nutritional quality and the anticipated reactions of 
the incumbent firm.  
 
We compute the prices and the market share for the two products, as well as the new 
product’s quality and variety according to demand characteristics (i.e., the level and 
heterogeneity in consumers’ preferences related to nutritional issues) and policy scenarios. 
Moreover, we determine the health impacts of the firms’ decisions at equilibrium. We assume 
that at the level of the individual consumer the health benefit is linked to the quality of the 6 
 
product a consumer chooses. From a public health standpoint, the overall population’s health 
depends on the following: (i) the nutritional quality of the marketed products and (ii) the 
market share of these products. On this basis, we compute a health index that takes into 
account both nutritional quality and the two products’ market shares. 
 
In the first section, we consider an unregulated benchmark case and assess the market 
equilibrium according to consumer sensitivity to nutritional quality. As intuitively expected, 
changes in food quality and price depend on the level of consumer sensitivity to nutritional 
quality, and increases in consumer awareness regarding nutritional issues improve the overall 
health benefits associated with food consumption. However, we also highlight an adverse 
effect: if consumer heterogeneity is high enough, an information policy can simultaneously 
improve health benefits to the population as a whole but worsen the health of consumers that 
are less aware of nutrition effects. 
 
In the second section, we study the impacts of implementing a nutritional tax. We consider 
that both firms face such a nutritional tax, but the new entrant may avoid it if the nutritional 
quality of the new product is above a threshold defined by public authorities. We examine 
both of the effects of this minimum threshold and the tax level.  
 
The theoretical literature relating to taxation effects in vertically differentiated markets rely on 
the initial papers of Cremer and Thisse (1994) and Constantatos and Sartzetakis (1999) that 
demonstrated that an ad-valorem tax leads to a decrease in product differentiation and 
generates jumps in the aggregate quality supplied on the market. Other works focused on the 
effects of taxes on environmental quality in vertically differentiated markets and raised 
questions related to the nutritional issues discussed here. Cremer and Thisse (1999) highlight 
the positive effect of a commodity tax on environmental quality in the context of imperfect 
competition because it increases the number of active firms. Like Amacher et al. (2004), who 
found that an under-provision of quality exists when the high-quality firm is more efficient in 
investing, Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) showed that a duopoly generates insufficient quality in 
the presence of negative externality. They also found that the use of only one instrument (e.g., 
an ad-valorem tax, an emission tax or a subsidy) does not achieve the social optimum even if 
the social welfare increases. The achievement of higher quality requires the use of an ad-
valorem tax along with either a subsidy or an emission tax. Conrad (2005) identified three 
Nash equilibria that depended on both the degree of environmental awareness and the 7 
 
production cost. The effect of an instrument depends on the equilibrium. When consumers 
exhibit strong levels of environmental concern, either a subsidy to reduce the production cost 
or an information campaign leads the low-quality firm to produce the environmentally 
friendly good. In the presence of a high production cost and weak levels of environmental 
concern, the high-quality firm overproduces the environmentally friendly good and thus the 
social equilibrium leads to the implementation of a tax. Finally, in an intermediate case, two 
instruments are needed to achieve the social optimum. García-Gallego and Georgantzís 
(2009) focus on the incidence of consumer heterogeneity on firms’ choices when the vertical 
differentiation relies on the firm’s corporate social responsibility. They show that increasing 
consumers’ environmental awareness can in some cases lead to a decrease in the social 
welfare that is linked to a decrease in quality. Although this literature investigates 
environmental issues rather than nutritional ones, such studies are interesting to consider here 
as they highlight the potential effects of tax policies in a product differentiation framework. In 
particular, they reveal that firms’ responses in terms of price and quality can weaken the 
impact of public policies in some cases. We discuss this issue in the last section, which 
considers the case of a tax policy aimed at reducing health externalities.  
 
 




Health issues are only one of many criteria that determine food consumption choices. Each 
individual food decision depends on both immediate benefits, such as taste or the convenience 
of the product, and long-term health-related consequences. To consider the multiple 
dimensions of consumer preference, we adopt a double differentiation model (Neven and 
Thisse, 1989).  
 
First we assume that, as in a vertical differentiation model, consumers reveal different 
preferences related to a given nutritional characteristic x. We assume that this characteristic 
leads to a health benefit that increases with x (e.g., fiber, iron or vitamin content). We denote 
θ the preference parameter based on nutritional quality. A consumer j gives a level of 
importance θj to the attribute x; the higher the parameter θj is, the more sensitive the consumer 
is to the nutritional attribute. All consumers are aware of this attribute because of nutritional 
labeling.  8 
 
 
As a consumer’s food choices vary according to their social groups, we assume the existence 
of two groups of consumers with different levels of sensitivity to nutritional quality. We 
assume that the importance θ that a consumer assigns to nutritional quality takes two different 
values depending on the group the consumer belongs to: θ1  for group 1 and θ2 for group 2. 
We assume that θ1= γθ2 with  1 ≤ γ . The proportional parameter γ  reveals the heterogeneity 
across the two sub-populations relating to their nutritional quality preferences.  
 
Secondly, as in horizontal differentiation models, consumers have heterogeneous preferences 
over the product variety. This second attribute, denoted y, aggregates all of the other features, 
(e.g., texture, aroma and convenience) that make the product appealing to consumers. These 
features are independent of the nutritional quality. These preferences are uniformly distributed 
on the variety axis [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ y . The closer the product attribute yi is to the location of consumers’ 
ideal point, the more consumers enjoy consuming product i. In this model, it appears as if 
each consumer bears a transportation cost that is proportional to the distance between his 
preferred location on the segment [0,1] and the variety value yi offered by firm i. The cost is 
assumed to be quadratic. 
 
The utility of a consumer of type j (defined by θj and yj) who buys a unit of a good with 
nutritional value xi at price pi that is located at yi is given by:  
 
2 (,) ( ) jii j i i j i Uxy V x p d y y θ =+ −− −          (1) 
where V denotes the reservation price of each consumer and  ( ) ji dy y −  is the transportation 
cost with  0 d > .  
 
In this market for differentiated goods, two firms compete by choosing the two characteristics 
of their products along with their prices. The incumbent firm, denoted A, sells an outside 
good whose characteristics are exogenous (Steven C. Salop, 1979). The attributes of this 
product are normalized to zero; in other words,  0 aa xy = = . Although the incumbent, firm A, 
cannot change the quality of its product, its pricing decision may prevent firm B from offering 
a healthier product. The standard product A is processed at a lower production cost because of 
its low nutritional quality. The new entrant B may decide to offer a new higher nutritional 9 
 
quality product by choosing the level of the attributes  b x  and  b y  and its selling price. By 
offering a new healthy product, firm B expects to capture some of the willingness to pay of 
consumers who are aware of health issues. However, it may also lose market share because of 
firm A’s reaction. The new entrant B decides whether to enter the market and determines how 
to differentiate the new product in terms of variety and nutritional quality to reach maximal 
profit. This decision relies on expected gains from demand, costs associated with nutritional 
quality and the anticipated reactions of the incumbent.  
 
Without loss of generality, the marginal production cost of the variety yi is normalized to zero. 











= (where α ≥ 0).   
We assume that firms A and B sell the same product to both groups of consumers (i.e., the 
firms are mono-product). Moreover, we assume that they do not change prices to fit either of 
the two populations. Thus, the prices and attributes  , , and aab b x yx y   are the same for both 
groups. However, the quantities sold to both sub-markets can be different.  
 
Under these conditions, the utility  () jk UA ∈  of a consumer j belonging to group k, k=1,2, who 
consumes product A, and the utility  () jk UB ∈  of a consumer j belonging to group k, k=1,2, 
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=+ − − − = ⎪ ⎩
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On this basis, we examine under what conditions a product with higher quality ( 0 b x > ) enters 
the market and leads to an improvement in the overall population’s nutritional state. In our 
framework, we propose a two-stage entry game. In the first stage, the firm that offers the 
entrant product chooses the variety and nutritional quality of the product. In the second stage, 
both firms compete in terms of price.  
 
1.2. The quality-price game 
 10 
 
To solve the two-stage entry game described previously, we determine the perfect equilibrium 
by backward induction. We determine the Nash price equilibrium in the sub-game given the 
attributes  b x  and  b y  (firm A’s attributes are normalized to zero). Secondly, we determine the 
optimal attributes  b x  and  b y  that firm B chooses when entering the market. 
We start by determining the market share  i D , as a function of the prices determined at the 
second stage of the game. We then express both firms’ profit  ( , , ) iii i x yp Π  to obtain the 
equilibrium.  
 
Market share and profits  
 
We identify the location ỹj of the consumer who is indifferent between purchasing product A 
or B in each consumer group by setting equal, for each value θj, the two utility functions. This 
is defined by: 
2 2 ) ~ ( ~
b j b b j j a y y d p x V y d p V − − − + = − − θ  
We then deduce: 
b
b a b b j
j dy




2 + − + −
=
θ
      (3) 
 
The demand faced by firms A and B from the two consumer groups 1 and 2 are respectively 
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Using these demand functions and the production cost structure, we determine the profit 




















       (6) 
 
 
The price equilibrium 
 
We determine the price equilibrium for the second stage of the game by simultaneously 
solving the maximization program for both firms (each firm i maximizes its profit with 
respect to its decision variable pi where I = a, b).  
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6
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6
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⎪ ⎩    (7) 
As expected, product B’s price increases as the nutritional attribute  b x  increases. It should 
also be noted that  a p  is increasing in b y . Increases in the variety differentiation relax price 
competition, leading to an increase in the price of the low quality product a p . 
 
Characteristics of the entrant product  
 
In the first stage of the game, firm B determines both the optimal level of nutritional quality 
and the variety attribute. It maximizes its profit with respect to  b x  and  b y  and has information 
regarding the sub-game price equilibrium (equation 7). By substituting (7) into (6), we get: 
2
2 [2 (4 ) (2 ) (1 ) ]
(,)
36
bb b b b
Bbb
b
dy y x x x
xy
dy
α αγ θ −− + + +
Π=       (8) 












2 , then firm B chooses 
* 0 bm x = and 
* 1 bm y =  in the game’s perfect equilibrium.  
                                                 
1 Proof is available from the authors upon request 12 
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where the functions are denoted by: 





























Result (i) states that when the willingness  2 θ  is sufficiently small  2 (2 / ( 1 ) ) θ αγ ≤+ , 
consumers who exhibit higher levels of health concerns are not willing to pay enough to bear 
the cost associated with the production of products with improved nutritional quality  0 b x > . 
The optimal entry decision of firm B is then 
* 1 bm y =  and 
* 0 bm x = . The two firms differentiate 
themselves on the horizontal axis at maximum and reduce their product differentiation at their 
minimum on the vertical axis (Neven and Thisse, 1989). 
 
When the willingness to pay  2 θ  is sufficiently high ( 2 2/ ( 1 ) θ αγ >+ ), firm B chooses to 
produce a product with a higher nutritional quality level (
* 0 bm x > ) to capture the willingness 
of this consumer group to pay. The nutritional quality is increasing in  2 θ , whereas the variety 
is decreasing in  2 θ . The two firms increase their product differentiation regarding nutritional 
quality and come closer on the variety axis. Price competition is strengthened when firm B 
reduces its product differentiation relating to variety and consequently, firm A diminishes its 
price at equilibrium. Firm B relies on the increase in nutritional quality to capture market 
share even if the price  b p   increases. The higher  2 θ   gets, the more the profit of firm B 
increases and the profit of firm A diminishes.  
 
1.3. Impact on consumers’ health  
 
Proposition 1 shows that if  2 θ  is sufficiently high, the entry of firm B into the market can 
improve the nutritional quality of the food supply. Knowing prices, the firms’ market shares 
and the characteristics of the products at equilibrium, we can derive the health impact on 
consumers. We assume that, at the individual consumer level, the health benefit is linked to 13 
 
the quality of the product a consumer chooses. A consumer j that consumes a unit of product 
A has no health benefit (denoted j h ) because  0 a x = . In contrast, a consumer who consumes a 
unit of product B displays a health benefit  j h  that increases with b x . For simplicity, we 
assume that health effects are linear
2 and the health benefit  j h  of a consumer j when he 
consumes a unit of product B is 
*
jb m hx = . 
 
From a public health perspective, the overall population’s health depends on (i) the nutritional 
quality of the marketed products and (ii) the market shares of the different products. On this 
basis, we can compute a health index that takes into account both nutritional quality and the 
market shares of the two products. The health state can be improved through two 
mechanisms: by facilitating product substitution and thus increasing the market share of 
product B, or by increasing the nutritional quality of product B. On this basis, we can define 
the health benefit  T H  for the whole population, the health benefit  1 H  for consumer group 1 
and the health benefit  2 H   for consumer group 2 as: 
*
Tb b m HD x = , 
*
11 bb m HD x = , 
*




The two following assertions are simultaneously checked: 
 (i)  
2
2
,] 0 , 1 ] , 0
T H θγ θ




H There exists   such that :  0 θ θ
∂ > ∂
%  if and only if  2 2
~
θ θ < . 
Proof: see Appendix. 
 
Setting  1 θ , when  2 θ  increases, product A’s market share diminishes and product B’s market 
share increases. For the whole population, the simultaneous increase of the nutritional quality 
*
b x  and the market share  b D  has a positive effect on the health criterion HT. However, this 
result does not necessarily hold for both consumer groups when  1 < γ . The increase in b p , 
linked to the increase in the second group’s nutritional awareness  2 θ  and the decrease in a p , 
                                                 
2 The nutritional epidemiology literature provides little information to determine the nature of this relationship or 
whether or not it is linear. 
3 Proof is available from the authors upon request. 14 
 
reduces the market share  1 b D  and increases 1 a D . When  2 θ  increases but remains lower than a 
threshold value  2 θ % , consumers who consume product B benefit from an improvement of their 
health because of the enhancement of b x , even if progressively fewer consumers from group 1 
purchase product B. In that case, the health benefit H1 increases because the improvement in 
the nutritional characteristic of each product exceeds the reduction in the market size. When 
2 θ overtakes the threshold  2 θ % , the effect linked to the reduction in product B’s market share 
exceeds the effect linked to the improvement in product B’s quality and H1 diminishes (see 












It is important to keep in mind that this result does not rely only on the increasing 
differentiation of health demand between the two consumer groups (with  1 θ  set, γ  becomes 
smaller and smaller). The firms’ reactions can amplify this effect. Firm B attempts to capture 
the increasing willingness to pay by simultaneously increasing xb and pb. The incumbent, firm 
A, prevents the entry of the nutritionally improved product by diminishing its price.  
 
This result has broader implications and contributes to the debate regarding the impact of 
public campaigns on nutritional information. Governments usually consider information 
campaigns to be one of the most efficient instruments for changing consumer behavior. If we 
assume that the increase in  2 θ  is the result of a public information campaign that aims to 
convince consumers to change their food habits (i.e., increase their willingness to pay for 
nutritional quality), and that the information acquisition and the ability to process it through 15 
 
information campaigns depends on a consumer’s type
4 ( 2 θ  increases with  1 < γ ), then 
corollary 1 and results (i) and (ii) highlight an unexpected potential effect of this instrument.  
 
Assuming that the acquisition and processing of information are different for the two 
consumer groups and that the information campaign generates a substantial increase in group 
2’s willingness to pay (i.e.,  1 θ  and  2 θ  increase but γ  strongly decreases), we can then observe 
increased health benefits for the whole population (represented by the sum of the health 
benefits of the two groups) and a deterioration in the health state of the population that is less 
aware of the nutritional dimension (group 1).  
 
 
2.  Tax policy assessment 
 
It has been shown previously that information policies can generate an unsettling ethical side 
effect. Specifically, the health of the whole population improves because of the health benefits 
experienced by only one of the two consumer groups. In this section, we examine whether a 
taxation scheme may be more efficient than an information policy in improving consumers’ 
health and investigate whether it removes or reduces these unexpected and biased effects. To 
improve the nutritional quality of the products offered by firms, the taxation must be designed 
as a “penalty” instrument for firms that do not meet the minimum nutritional quality standard 
defined by the regulator
5. In the following section, we include this instrument in our 
benchmark model to examine the effects of this indirect tax. 
  
We assume that the regulator defines a minimum quality threshold xmin and reveals it to the 
firms. All products i whose characteristic xi is less than xmin face an ad-valorem tax t. In this 
framework, product A always faces the tax. We also keep in mind that product A is an outside 
good, and thus the incumbent firm cannot change its initial characteristics. Firm B manages 
competition with the incumbent A by adjusting its two instruments (xb and yb) with respect to 
the minimum quality threshold enforced by the regulator. When setting the tax level t, firm 
                                                 
4 Numerous studies have established that consumer reaction to information campaigns and nutritional labelling is 
also heterogeneous (Lusk and Bridgeman, 2009; Baum II and Ruhm, 2009; Rashad, 2006; Variyam, 2008). 
5 When labeling is mandatory, as it is in many countries, such a tax might not be difficult to set up. Brownell et 
al. (2009) proposed this type of tax for soft drinks. Products face the tax when the sugar content is above 1 g of 
sugar / ounce (30 ml).  16 
 
B’s choices depend on the minimum nutritional quality threshold  min x  as described below. 
The profit, demand and price functions are given in the Appendix.  
 
-  When the minimum quality threshold is slightly restrictive (
*
min bm x x < ), firm B chooses 
not to face the tax and the optimal characteristics are given by ( b b y x ~ ; ~ ). 
-  When the minimum quality threshold is more restrictive (
*
min bm x x > ), two cases occur. 
We denote  b x  as the minimum quality threshold for which firm B is indifferent 
between choosing the quality threshold  min x  or coping with the ad-valorem tax. When 
the regulator chooses an intermediate value for the nutritional threshold 
*
min bm b x xx << , firm B chooses the minimum quality threshold and its profit is higher 
than if it paid the tax. The optimal characteristics are given by ( () min min ; b xy x). When 
b x x > min , firm B decides to face the tax instead of choosing to produce a nutritional 
quality equal to min x . The optimal characteristics are given by ( b b y x ˆ ; ˆ ). 
We summarize the results in the following proposition:  
Proposition 2









b , then product B’s characteristics are xb
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6 Proof is available from the authors upon request 17 
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Impacts on the nutritional quality and variety 
 
-  When the minimum quality threshold is low, firm B chooses the quality  b x %  that it 
adopts without constraints (as in the benchmark model). By doing so, it avoids being 
taxed (cf. Figures 2a and 2b, area 1). As a consequence, firm B takes advantage of 
this competition scenario by reducing the distance between products B and A on the 
horizontal axis. 
-  When the quality threshold is more restrictive (
*
min bm b x xx ≤ < ), firm B chooses the 
nutritional quality threshold  min x  (cf. Figure 2a and 2b, area 2). It thus produces a 
higher nutritional quality than in the benchmark and avoids taxation. However, when 
the nutritional quality threshold increases, the variety yb increases as well. Firm B 
offsets the increase in nutritional quality by a growing differentiation of variety. Thus, 
price competition is softened. 
-  When the quality standard is very restrictive ( b x x ≥ min ), firm B forgoes the quality 
standard and faces the tax (cf. Figure 2a and 2b, area 3). It then chooses a lower 
nutritional quality level than the benchmark nutritional quality, 
*




























































Figure 2a                                                            Figure 2b 
 
It is obvious that the nutritional tax provides a strategic advantage to the entrant firm B when 
firm B agrees to meet the minimum quality standard. If the threshold  min x  is lower than the 
benchmark quality 
*
bm x  then this competitive advantage does not modify the quality of the 
products available on the market. However, it alters the variety location and thus affects price 
competition. When the regulator defines a restrictive quality threshold that is too high, firm B 
is not able to meet it. The product quality will then be lower than the quality observed in the 
benchmark case. The regulator can only encourage an improvement of product B’s quality for 
intermediate values of the nutritional quality threshold. 
 
Impacts on prices and quantities 
 
In most of the situations examined, prices pa and pb are higher than the observed prices in the 
benchmark model (cf. Figures 3a and 3b). 
 
In area 1, the price pa increases because firm A transfers part of the tax to consumers. Because 
it avoids taxation, firm B gains a competitive advantage. As a result of this competitive 
advantage, it reduces the variety differentiation by moving closer to ya and it increases pb 
without varying the nutritional quality xb. The variation of the price ratio pa / pb induced by 
the tax faced by firm A and the reduction in the variety differentiation leads some consumers 
to switch from product A to B. In this area, product B’s market share is thus higher than the 
market share observed in the benchmark.  
 
In area 2, when xmin increases, firm B transfers some of the cost associated with the 
improvement in product B’s nutritional quality to consumers. As product B moves further on 19 
 
the horizontal axis (yb increases), the competition intensity diminishes, and the price of the 
taxed product A increases. In this area, product B’s market share diminishes as xmin increases. 
Firm B’s market share is higher than the observed market share in the benchmark only if 
min b x x < .  
 
In area 3, firm B faces the tax and chooses a quality xb lower than the quality it produces 
without constraint. Price pb is thus lower than the price observed in the benchmark, and its 
market share is greater. 
BM
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Figure 3a                                                            Figure 3b 
 
Impacts on health benefits 
 
In general, product B’s market share  b D  in the whole population decreases as the nutritional 
quality standard xmin increases, whereas the product’s quality is increasing (as long as 
b x x < min ). The health effects depend on the relative variation of  b D  and xb in each of the 
identified areas (cf. Figure 4a). 
 
In area 1, the overall health benefits HT increase in comparison to the benchmark. Some 
consumers move from product A to product B because of the change in the price ratio pa / pb. 
Compared with the benchmark, the quality of product B has not changed. 
 
In area 2, product B’s market share  b D  diminishes and the nutritional quality xb increases. 
Here, the quality effect dominates; even if fewer consumers purchase product B, the 
improvement in the quality xb alone can increase HT.  
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In area 3, the quality xb, product B’s market share and the overall health benefits, HT, are 





























  Figure 4a                                                            Figure 4b 
 
The results for consumer group 1 (cf. Figure 4b) differ from those observed for the overall 
population. In area 2, when xmin increases, the quality effect dominates the decrease in the 
market share  1 b D  and the health benefits for consumers who purchase product B are greater 
than the health losses linked to the consumers who give up product B as a result of its increase 
in price. These effects reverse at  min b x x = & , at which point the loss in the market share  1 b D  
leads to a deterioration in consumer group 1’s health. The quality standard that maximizes the 
health benefit for consumer group 1 is thus lower than the quality standard that maximizes the 
health benefit for the whole population. Furthermore, if the standard is too restrictive, the 
health benefits for consumer group 1 deteriorate and become lower than that observed in the 
benchmark. Health inequalities (represented by the ratio H2 / H1) become larger in area 2 (cf. 
Figure 5). When the minimum quality threshold  b x x & < min , the health gain with respect to the 
benchmark relies on both the increase in product B’s market share and the improvement in 
quality. As a consequence, the health disparity is reduced. When b b x x x < < min & , the health 
gain relies only on the increase in nutritional quality, and fewer consumers purchase product 
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2.2. Impacts of the tax rate 
 
Previously, the tax level was assumed to be a constant. We now examine how our results 
change with changes in the tax level.  
 
When the minimum quality threshold is not strongly restrictive ( min b x x < ), an increase in 
the tax level does not affect the nutritional quality; however, it changes the competition in 
terms of variety. Firm B chooses the nutritional quality 
*
bm x  if 
*
min bm x x <  and  min x if 
*
min bm b x xx <<  while the variety  b y  decreases with the tax t (Figure 6). The greater the tax 
becomes, the more firm B is able to choose a variety close to  a y  and the more the incumbent 
firm A is penalized. Furthermore, firm B is able to increase its market share. Both prices 
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When the minimum quality standard is strongly restrictive ( min b x x > ), both firms face the 
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The tax level produces two opposing effects on health benefits. The increases in the tax 
improve the overall health benefits, but this improvement varies between the consumer 
groups. The higher the tax, the greater the potential health benefits are for population 1 
( () () 12 bb x tx t < && , Figure 7). Thus, increases in the tax level reduce the health inequalities.  
 
3.  Discussion 
 
 
The main goal of this paper was to assess the effects of nutritional policies that aim to modify 
consumer food choices by taking into account firms’ reactions to nutritional policies, 
particularly in terms of product quality and price. From this analysis, we were able to 
determine a health index that makes it possible to introduce a cost-benefit analysis of these 
public policies.  
 
The modeling proposed here is based on several assumptions that are important to keep in 
mind. First, we assumed that consumers’ decisions result from a trade-off that depends on two 
types of product characteristics in addition to the price of the marketed products: a dimension 23 
 
quantifying nutritional quality, for which consumers are assumed to have a heterogeneous 
willingness’s to pay; and a variety dimension that expresses differences in consumers’ 
preferences for the combined non-nutritional characteristics of the products.  
 
Second, we considered a duopoly comprised of an incumbent firm that markets a product with 
fixed quality and variety characteristics and a firm entering the market that can decide to 
introduce a healthier product to the market. Here, we adopted an assumption used by Salop 
(1979), who investigated the conditions of entry for new products when the incumbent firm 
only reacted by adjusting price. Thus, we aimed to determine the conditions of introduction 
for a new, nutritionally improved product when the incumbent firm markets a product without 
nutritional benefit but is able to obstruct the entry of the new product by adjusting its pricing 
reaction.  
 
Finally, we examined the health effects on the population by proposing a health index in 
which the population’s health is improved either by the increase in the nutritional quality from 
the new product or by an increase in its market share.  
 
Within this framework, we were particularly interested in a public intervention based on a 
nutritional tax, the implementation of which is accompanied by the quality efforts carried out 
by the firms. Thus, whereas the incumbent firm is systematically taxed because it always 
produces a null quality, the entering firm can be exempted from tax if the product it markets is 
of a quality that is higher than the minimum threshold defined by the public authorities. 
Public authorities thus have two ways to influence the firms’ behavior: by adjusting the 
minimum quality threshold of the new product and the level of the tax. A priori, the interest of 
such a taxation policy is to let the firms choose their responses and decide either to accept the 
tax and not attempt to produce a higher quality product or to avoid the tax by improving the 
quality of the marketed product.  
 
Initially, we determined the firms’ decisions relating to price, quality and variety at the market 
equilibrium in the absence of public intervention. Naturally, as soon as a fraction of the 
population is willing to pay for a higher nutritional quality, the entering firm may find it 
beneficial to offer a product that is differentiated from the product already available on the 
market. The stronger the willingness of the more health-conscious population is to pay for the 
nutritional dimension, the higher the nutritional quality chosen by the entrant firm, but the 24 
 
closer the two products will be on the variety axis. One finds a classical result of double 
differentiation models: at equilibrium the firms choose a maximum differentiation on one axis 
and a minimal differentiation on the other. To limit its loss of market share related to the entry 
of the new product, the incumbent firm can decrease the price of the low quality product. 
From a public health point of view, two effects must be considered: the positive effect 
associated with the introduction of a higher nutritional quality product and the negative effect 
associated with the drop in price of the low quality product. Interventions seeking to better 
inform consumers influence this equilibrium and the degree of heterogeneity between the 
consumer groups. Thus, if this degree of heterogeneity is strong, the increase in the 
willingness of consumers, who are already sensitive to health issues, to pay pushes the 
entering firm to raise its level of quality and its price. Therefore, the product becomes 
progressively less accessible to consumers that are less sensitive to health issues, leading 
these consumers to rely more largely on the low quality product. A drop in the price of the 
low quality product reinforces this effect.  
 
Compared to an unregulated situation, taxation policies allow for increases in health benefits 
related to food consumption under some conditions.  
 
Of course, the minimum threshold defined by the authorities that allows the entering product 
to avoid taxation must be higher than the quality spontaneously chosen by the firm in the 
unregulated situation. However, the minimum threshold of quality imposed on the entering 
firm must remain moderate. Beyond a certain threshold, the entering firm will prefer to pay 
the tax; in such a case, the quality of the new product will be lower than the benchmark 
quality. As a result, the health benefits for the whole population will be weaker than in an 
unregulated case. Furthermore, when the threshold is too high, the health benefit decreases 
most significantly for the population that is not sensitive to the health issue (even if the 
benefit for the whole population continues to grow). Thus, if the minimum threshold is too 
high, the non-sensitive consumers are disproportionately penalized and health disparities 
within the population will be increased.  
 
This result is due to the fact that the tax, if the entering firm decides to avoid it, gives an 
advantage to the new firm and penalizes the incumbent firm. The new entrant can then 
produce a higher quality product than in the unregulated case while at the same time getting a 
larger market share and increasing its price. The incumbent firm that bears the taxation 25 
 
transfers a part of this tax to the final price. However, this price increases more slowly than 
the high quality product price, as the incumbent firm tries to limit its loss of market share. If 
the minimum threshold remains moderate, the health effect resulting from the improvement in 
the differentiated product quality dominates the health degradation that results from the 
consumption displacement toward the low quality product. Beyond a certain threshold, the 
phenomenon is reversed.   
 
Increases in the tax level improve the health benefit for the whole population while reducing 
health disparities. This result is due to the fact that the tax does not have an effect on the 
nutritional quality chosen by the entering firm but affects its variety choice. The greater the 
taxation level, the more the incumbent firm is penalized and the closer the products will be in 
terms of variety. The health benefit induced by the tax is thus related to the increase in the 
market share of the new product and not to any increase in its nutritional quality. Conversely, 
increasing the minimum quality threshold causes a beneficial effect (assuming this threshold 
is not too high) by increasing the quality of the new product (of course, the market share of 
the new product decreases as the minimum threshold increases).  
 
From a public health perspective, it seems that authorities should not implement an 
excessively high minimum quality threshold and should instead implement a high tax. 
However, this conclusion must be tempered by considering the economic impact of taxation. 
Indeed, it has been shown that the prices of the two products will increase when the tax level 
increases. An increase in health benefits, particularly among consumers that are less sensitive 
to nutritional issues, may be observed; however, an increase in food expenditures will also be 
observed, particularly among the less sensitive consumers. Thus, an increase in the tax level 
can reduce health disparities but increase economic disparities.  
  
The robustness of this study’s results should be evaluated by further investigating some 
complementary issues. For example, at this stage we have assumed that the health effect was a 
linear function of the products’ nutritional quality. If we assume a nonlinear function, the 
results of this study would likely be affected. In addition, we assumed that the two 
dimensions, the product quality and variety, were independent. It would be interesting to 
examine a case in which the improvement of nutritional quality affects the taste of the 
products and thus affects their positioning in the variety category.  
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In addition, it would be interesting to analyze the combined effects of an information policy 
(which alters consumer preferences for nutritional quality) and a taxation policy in more detail 
while remaining within the framework adopted in this paper. We have shown that an 
information policy may induce an increase in health disparities whereas taxation policy can, 
under certain conditions, reduce them. It would be interesting to identify the optimal policy-
mix, particularly when one considers that the tax revenues can be used to fund the information 
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